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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In  April  2015,  the  Belgian  Federal  Minister  for  Social  Affairs  and  Public  Health  launched  an  Action  Plan  to
reform  the  hospital  landscape.  With  the  creation  of  “localregional  clinical  hospital  networks”  with  their
own  governance  structures,  the plan follows  the  international  trend  towards  hospital  consolidation  and
collaboration.  The  major  complicating  factors  in the  Belgian  context  are  (1)  that  policy  instruments  for
the  redesign  of  the  hospital  service  delivery  system  are  divided  between  the  federal  government  and
the  federated  authorities,  which  can  result  in  an  asymmetric  hospital  landscape  with  a potentially  better
distribution  of  clinical  services  in  the  Flanders  hospital  collaborations  than in  the  other  federated  entities;eform
ospitals
and  (2)  the  current  regulations  stipulate  that  only  hospitals  (and  not  networks)  are  entitled  to  hospital
budgets.  Although  the  reform  is  the  most  significant  and  drastic  transformation  of the Belgian hospital
sector  in  the  last  three  decades,  networks  mainly  offer  a framework  in  which  hospitals  can  collaborate.
More  regulation  and  policy  measures  are  needed  to enhance  collaboration  and  distribution  of  clinical
services.
utho© 2019  The  A
. Introduction
Worldwide in the healthcare sector, new forms of collaboration
nd governance structures have been developed as a response to
he growing pressure to reduce costs without affecting quality or
ccess to care [1,2]. There is a common trend towards hospital con-
olidation and the creation of hospital groups and multihospital
etworks, particularly in the United States and, more recently, in
uropean countries [3,4]. For instance, 2007 saw a structural reform
n Denmark, which introduced a system with five regions (replacing
3 counties) and 98 municipalities (replacing 275 smaller munic-
palities). The reform aimed to encourage the specialization of the
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most complex hospital services across the country into fewer hos-
pitals (the number of hospital beds has fallen from 25,000 in 1996
to 18,000 by 2009) and also provided an opportunity for the govern-
ment to further rationalise the size and number of hospitals across
the country [5]. To answer these challenges in Belgium, the Minis-
ter for Social Affairs and Public Health launched an Action Plan in
April 2015 to reform the hospital landscape [6].
Currently, the dominant form of hospital care organization in
Belgium is the standalone hospital with its own governance struc-
ture (board, executive management and medical council) offering
the widest possible range of medical services to be competitive
with other hospitals in the region. In combination with the dense
Belgian hospital landscape this results in a high degree of disper-
sion and fragmentation in both general services (such as emergency
departments [7] and maternity services [4]) and more specialized
services (like complex cancer surgery [8] and major trauma care
[9]). This reform thus aims to enhance collaboration that facili-
tates task distribution (i.e., agreements between hospitals about the
supply of hospital services with the intention to decrease fragmen-
tation) and to strengthen the coordination of care by introducing
interorganizational networks, where more than two organizations
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/





























• The network board is responsible for establishing the strat-
egy of allocating care assignments to individual hospitals;
coordinating the supply of care assignments; ensuring
accessibility of local–regional care assignments; choos-
ing reference points and establishing referral agreements;
developing an admission policy; defining task agreements;
coordinating care with other providers within the geographic
area of the network; making arrangements about the finan-
cial means.
• The board of each hospital in the network is responsible for
implementing the strategic decisions taken by the network
board.
• A two-thirds majority is required to allocate care assign-
ments to individual hospitals; the allocation is binding.
Network chief medical officer (CMO) or network board
of CMOs
• The network has a CMO,  or a board of the CMOs of all hos-
pitals in the network.
• The network CMO is responsible for a coherent medical pol-
icy.
• Decisions taken by the network CMO  take precedence over
and, are opposable to, decisions of the CMO  of the hospitals.
Medical network council
• The medical network council represents the medical special-
ists in the network.
• The medical council of each hospitals advises the hospital
board on transfer to the network level of matters related to
the medical specialist’s status.
• The medical network council is exclusively authorized for
matters transferred to the network level.
Hospital and physician payments
• The Minister for Health can assign a separate hospital budget
for the local–regional clinical network. The individual hospi-
tals may  voluntarily transfer part of their hospital budget to
the network.
• When the general financial agreement is transferred to the
responsible for the definition of the basic legal characteristics of02 M. De Regge et al. / Heal
ork together with a collective goal and an integrated strategy
10]. In the reform plans, such collaboration is called “local–regional
linical hospital networks”. The focus is on collaborations between
ospitals around general clinical services. Another axis of the
eform plan is to concentrate complex, rare, high-cost care pro-
edures in a limited number of reference centres in Belgium. These
eference centres then require collaboration on the supraregional
evel.
To achieve this goal, the April 2015 Action Plan described the
rinciples of a redesigned hospital landscape: (1) hospital capacity
lanning should be based on population needs; (2) greater divi-
ion of tasks and collaboration initiatives between hospitals, and
etween hospitals and other care settings is needed; (3) hospitals
hould be part of a network; payments and permission to per-
orm certain activities should increasingly be granted to networks
nstead of to individual hospitals. The Action Plan’s basic principles
ave been operationalized in a vision statement (October 2016)
nd were given concrete shape in a concept paper in June 2017. A
raft Act amending some provisions of the Hospital Act of 10 July
008 was prepared and submitted for review to the Council of State
n March 2018 (see Box 1 for the main outlines for this Act) [11].
n 28 February the Law was approved in Parliament, stating that
ospital networks should be implemented by the 1 January 2020.
owever, due to the choices made during the reform process and
he specific context variables, it is unclear to what extent these legal
rovisions will result in the goals of the reform namely, increas-
ng the level of task distribution and coordination. In what follows,
e discuss the main reasons why this new Law alone might be
nsufficient.
Box 1: Core elements of the draft Act on hospital net-
works (March 2018).Network
• The Belgian hospital landscape will consist of no more than
25 local–regional clinical hospital networks.
• Each general hospital is obliged to join one and only one
local–regional clinical hospital network.
• Collaboration is within a contiguous geographic area and
hospitals in the network must offer care assignments that
are complementary to each other.
• A distinction is made between local–regional and suprare-
gional care assignments. Local–regional care assignments
must be provided within each local–regional network;
supraregional care assignments may  not be offered within
each local–regional network.
• Patients have free choice of provider.
Governance
• The local–regional clinical network has a governance struc-
ture consisting of three bodies: network board, chief medical
officer (or board of chief medical officers), and medical net-
work council.
Network board
• Every hospital has at least one representative on the network
board, who is also on the hospital board.
• The network board has at least one independent board mem-
ber.
• At least one-third of members must be experts in health-
care, of which at least one a physician not employed by the
collaborating hospitals.network level than the rules for the medical specialists’
remuneration and contribution (to medical activity operating
costs) on network level can be decided [8].
2. Challenges in the reform policy process to improving the
distribution of clinical services and coordination
The main stakeholders involved in this policy process were the
policy-makers on the different levels of government, the hospitals
and their federations, and the physicians and physician unions.
2.1. Policy levers for enhancing collaboration are the
responsibility of different governments
Specific agenda dynamics will produce different policy frames
on multilevel policy levels when implementing a reform at country
level [12]. This is a great challenge in the case of a large reform, since
relations between different policy levels will have to be effectively
coordinated. In Belgium, the responsibilities within the hospital
service delivery system are divided between the federal govern-
ment and the federated authorities. In short, the federal level ishospitals, payments to hospitals and physicians, and the defini-
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ospital beds (e.g., six acute geriatric hospital beds per 1000 inhab-
tants over 65 years of age), hospital services (e.g., the number of
ET- scanners), care programmes (e.g., the number of stroke units),
nd so on. The federated authorities (Flanders, Brussels, and Wal-
onia) are responsible for defining and granting licencing standards
for example, criteria regarding the required staff, equipment, and
nfrastructure) and budgets to invest in hospital infrastructure.
In the context of the networks, it is up to the federal state to
pecify the “governance structure of the networks” and to make
t compulsory for hospitals to be part of a local–regional clinical
etwork by making this a basic legal characteristic of hospitals; to
ork out the payment rules for local–regional clinical networks,
nd to determine the maximum number of networks and ser-
ices (e.g., the maximal number of local–regional clinical networks,
aternity units, and beds) for the country. However, it is up to the
ederated entities to define and grant the licencing criteria of the
ocal–regional clinical networks. In other words, the federated enti-
ies determine which hospital collaborations are approved, which
riteria their services need to fulfil (such as staff requirements for
aternity services), and which services are licenced (for exam-
le, which maternity services fulfil the licencing requirement and
eceive a licence). They also allocate the investment budgets (e.g.,
eciding whether a hospital receives a budget to build or renovate
ts maternity unit).
This fragmentation of responsibilities delayed the reform, since
he different governments had to find an agreement on the main
ines of the reform. Although a joint declaration of the different
overnments was published in 2015 [13], differences in vision
nd action were apparent. The vision of the Flemish government
as most in line with the federal reform plans, which resulted
n a joint letter from the Federal and the Flemish Ministers of
ealth addressed to Flemish hospitals. This letter included dead-
ines for those steps in the reform that are in line with federal
lans but for which the Flemish government is responsible. This
ncreased the pace of formation of hospital collaborations in Flan-
ers, while the pace was slower in the other federated entities.
s such, the complex structure of the Belgian state risks slow-
ng down this policy process and could result in an asymmetric
ospital landscape with a potentially better task distribution in
he Flanders’ hospital collaborations than in the other federated
ntities.
.2. Bottom-up developments are running ahead of top-down
uidance
The Minister has regularly stated that the initiative for creating
ocal–regional clinical networks belongs to the hospital sector. This
ottom-up development of the local–regional clinical networks
eaves room to collaborate with desired partners. This agrees with
he literature on healthcare policy which states that clinical leaders
re uniquely capable of enrolling colleagues; this is partly because
heir ability to relate to each other by means of historical and insti-
utional structures, often resulting in unique coalitions that span
he collegial networks and thus reconfigure the policy context [14].
onetheless, this bottom-up approach has permitted hospitals to
egotiate on high-end medical services, rather than focusing on
he priority, rationing basic general services. Hospitals attempt to
redict the enhanced centralization of complex and high-cost ser-
ices in their local–regional clinical network. By embedding these
ften financially lucrative and attractive services within own their
ocal–regional network, they seek to prevent them being further
entralized in supraregional collaborations.Beyond that, smaller hospitals want a guarantee of their sur-
ival within networks, and thus request high-end medical services
s a condition of joining a network. Hence, on the initiative of the
lemish Minister for Welfare, Public Health, and Family, represen-cy 123 (2019) 601–605 603
tatives of small Flemish hospitals (licenced for less than 400 beds)
discussed their role in the reformed hospital landscape, and pro-
posed introducing what they called “proxy emergency, maternity,
and paediatric services”. Essentially, their proposal can be sum-
marized as an attempt to obtain a situation in which all hospitals
continue to provide a wide range of services, though potentially
with a downscaled size [15].
To be coherent with the reform plans, the most logical collab-
orations are those between hospitals located to near each other.
Yet most of these hospitals were, and remain, competitors that
are seeking to attract patients and healthcare professionals from
the same pool; they also often have ideologically different back-
grounds. This rivalry cannot always be transcended, and hospitals
may  wish to consolidate historical partnerships that seem less
suitable to the envisaged reform. A substantive body of theory
and research on the role of culture in mergers suggests that
cultural differences can create major obstacles to achieving inte-
gration benefits. However, the opposite view—that differences in
culture between merging firms can be a source of value cre-
ation and learning—has also been advanced with empirically
support [16]. In any case, post hoc corrections by the govern-
ment would seem to be challenging, given that hospitals are
investing a great deal of energy, time, and resources into the
negotiations. These findings show the importance of combining
both strategies; this can be referred to as a bottom-up-top-down
strategy [17].
2.3. Collaboration is not easy when the money does not follow
(yet)
Network literature shows the importance of investing resources
on the network level [18]. However, this seems to be a major
shortcoming of the Belgian legislation. The Act stipulates that the
Minister for Health can allocate a separate hospital budget (“Bud-
get of Financial Means”, BFM) to a local–regional clinical network.
In the absence of a ministerial decree implementing this provi-
sion, this measure cannot be carried out immediately. Of course,
voluntary agreements concerning financial arrangements can be
concluded within the network.
In absence of a BFM on the network level, hospitals are not
inclined to give up certain services. The current rules for calculat-
ing and allocating the national budget to individual hospitals mean
that they will lose money, change their activities, or even have to
close services or departments. Since a two-thirds majority of the
network board is required to allocate care assignments to the indi-
vidual hospitals, it will be very difficult to rationalize the supply of
services within the network. Hospitals will ask for additional bud-
getary allocations to cover the start-up costs of the networks and
to finance new network functions.
2.4. Who  holds the power?
The need to involve stakeholders in collaboration governance
has previously been discussed [19]. Taking into account multiple
perspectives and different interests, and including of the voices of
stakeholders, should permit the development of thoughtful deci-
sions that taking a broader view of who  will benefit or be harmed
by any given action [19]. Furthermore, decisions produced through
strong engagement processes tend to be fairer, more durable, more
robust, and more efficacious [20]. However, stakeholders will also
attempt to sway the decisions and actions of the organization so as
to achieve results in a way  consistent with their needs and stakes
[21].
In response to stakeholder pressure, some requirements were
relaxed between the concept paper and the Act. An example is
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ept paper, the network had to cover about 400,000–500,000
nhabitants, and in large cities the areas could partly overlap.
his requirement to cover a specific target population is not
resent in the Act. However, the Act still states that there is a
aximum of 25 networks nationwide, implying an average of
00,000–500,000 inhabitants per network. Stakeholders repre-
enting hospitals located in less populated areas and in the Brussels
apital Region were against defining networks in terms of inhabi-
ants. In fact, about 35% of the patients in hospitals in the Brussels
apital region come from the other two regions, Flanders and Wal-
onia.
A second example concerns the maximum number of collab-
rations for supraregional care assignments; this number was
ncreased from a maximum of two to three reference points per
ocal–regional clinical network. The hospital sector feared that,
ithout such an increase, it would be necessary to halt existing
ollaborations that were perceived as successful.
A third example concerns the governance structure of the net-
ork. In the concept paper, the composition of the network board
eft a good deal of discretion to the individual network, while the
ole of the network chief medical officer and the network medical
ouncil were described in much greater detail. The physician unions
eacted strongly to the lack of guarantee of representation on the
etwork board. As a result, compared to the governance structure
f individual hospitals, the role of physicians under the networks
ill become much more significant. Physicians are present in all
overning bodies: at least one-third of board members must be
xperts in healthcare, of which at least one must be a physician
ot employed by the collaborating hospitals; the network medical
ouncil contains physicians only; and of course, the network chief
edical officer must be a physician. The hospital management is
equired to seek advice from the medical council on numbers of
opics listed in the Act. In the current version of the Hospital Act,
o-called “reinforced advice” is required for six topics (such as the
eneral agreement between medical staff and the hospital and the
etermination of which staff members are financed by deductions
o physician fees). This implies that, if the hospital management dis-
grees with the reinforced advice (and in practice fails to achieve
onsensus with the medical council after a deliberation process),
 rather cumbersome arbitration process must be initiated. In the
ew Act, the number of topics requiring reinforced advice has been
ncreased [11,22].
Although these changes include the voice of the stakeholders,
hey will lead to a prolonged and more complex decision-making
n the networks.
. Discussion
This analysis shows that achieving a distribution of clinical ser-
ices between hospitals in a network and better integrated care is
 major challenge for policy makers. Pina et al. (2015) and Chris-
iansen and Vrangbæk (2018) state that fragmentation of care exists
n multiple governmental levels (federal, state, and local) [23,24].
ndeed, integration is an approach that aims to resolve some
f the recurrent difficulties of modern bureaucracies: hyperspe-
ialization, organizational focus, and lack of cross-organizational
ngagement [25]. This study indicates that the Belgian reform will
ot be sufficient to achieve this goal. It instead represents an essen-
ial first step that should be accompanied by other policy measures,
uch as payment reform, more stringent planning, and adaptations
o licencing criteria. For example, a payment reform with budgets
or basic services allocated on the network level could support the
bjectives of the reform. Service planning should specify the max-
mum number of services to be implemented, together with more
trict licencing criteria. The process of reforming these criteria is farcy 123 (2019) 601–605
less developed than the legal framework for the clinical networks.
Furthermore, it reveals a different pace between the federated enti-
ties. While the federated entities in Brussels and Wallonia wait for
federal reform plans to become clear before undertaken action, the
available policy levers are being used in Flanders to the maximum
extent to enhance hospital collaboration and the distribution of
clinical services.
Another challenge in the Belgian context is the absence of
a governance structure that might commission services on the
level of geographically defined areas. In other countries, this is
played by local commissioners [1,2]. In the reform, this respon-
sibility is divided between the governance structure located on
the level of the hospital networks and the regulating authori-
ties. This is challenging, since it will require that the members of
the governing bodies be able to transcend the interests of their
individual hospitals. It is questionable whether this will happen
frequently, since the medical network council will equally rep-
resent each hospital, and a two-thirds majority will be required
to decide on task distribution. This would have been easier if
the network boards and medical councils had more autonomy
and fewer members. On the other hand, if successful, it will
certainly enhance the involvement of all hospitals and clini-
cians, and perhaps increase the confidence of all partners in the
network.
Further, legislation imposes only a relatively light form of hospi-
tal collaboration, in the form of an obligation for hospitals to be part
of a local–regional network. After all, the individual hospitals in a
network only collaborate for specific objectives maintaining their
separate legal identities. This might lead to a lower level of collabo-
ration than intended by the reform. Studies in other countries also
point to the difficulties and challenges in switching from a compet-
itive environment to increased collaboration. In the Netherlands
healthcare organizations seem reluctant to share their most spe-
cialized human resources, limiting the knowledge-sharing effects
of this type of relation due to the price-competitive market. A
higher level of collaboration only occurs within broader geograph-
ical areas where there is less competition [26]. A study in Italy
showed the importance of the pivotal role of a regulatory body in
balancing competitive and cooperative incentives and the strong
influence of medical professionals on the collaborative relation-
ships [27].
Since the Belgian reform does not trigger a far-reaching form of
collaboration, we point out that a more integrated form of collabo-
ration – such as a health system – leads to a better task distribution
of services and more efficiency. Indeed, according to Provan and
Milward (1995) high levels of integration among organizations
improve the quality of service delivery and thus results in better
outcomes on the client level [28]. Single ownership in a multihos-
pital system leads to tighter and more formal relationships between
the different hospitals. The decision making is delegated to a cen-
tral governance structure which increases efficiency and facilitates
governance based on the common interest of all parties involved
[29]. However, aiming for more integration also entails a num-
ber of challenges, especially in the context of professional service
organizations [30]. For example, more attention needs to be paid
to the way  in which professional values are connected to orga-
nizational strategy and the procedures that will complicate the
decision-making process.
While the current reform does not exclude the development of
health systems, it does not stimulate it either. The above arguments
clearly illustrate that some important steps have been taken in this
ambitious reform of the Belgian hospital sector, but also that to
make the ambition of the reform a reality some additional policy
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. Conclusion
The current reform plans envisage enhanced collaboration
etween hospitals through local–regional clinical hospital net-
orks (rationalizing basic care services in geographical areas) and
upraregional collaborations (further centralizing highly special-
zed services). This reform plan is both ambitious and urgently
eeded. When its objectives are achieved, it will be the most sig-
ificant and drastic transformation of the Belgian hospital sector in
he last three decades. Yet networks are only a first step, offering a
ramework in which hospitals can collaborate. To enhance task dis-
ribution, further regulation and policy measures are needed. After
ll, the reform must transform historic rivalries between hospitals
rom the same region into collaboration and an agreement on task
istribution. This will require top-down restrictions and allocation
echanisms on the network level.
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